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FOREWORD
CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER*
On November 15-16, 1990, a group of distinguished practitioners and
scholars assembled at Duke Law School to commemorate the twentieth
anniversary of the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA").
At that time, the articles in this volume were presented for critical discussion
and commentary. Sponsored by both Duke Law -School and Washington
University School of Law, the function of the 1990 symposium was to evaluate
EPA as an institution.
Over the past two decades, EPA has been the major federal agency
implementing federal environmental policy. The substance of that policy was
a target of evaluation and analysis prior to EPA's creation, and such scrutiny
has continued throughout EPA's existence. The substantive debates raised by
the federal government's role in the control of pollution, the regulation of
hazardous waste, the effort to clean up old dump sites, the protection of
wetlands, and the regulation of automobiles are certain to continue.
In the legitimate concern to debate substance, evaluating and analyzing
the institution charged with implementing federal policy should not be
neglected. When environmental policy moves from legislation to
implementation, it enters a complex institutional environment, one shaped by
internal and external incentives and pressures. Without a sufficient
appreciation of EPA's institutional environment, substantive environmental
policy decisions can be deflected, stalled, or altered in unintended ways.
After twenty years, we have a record of agency experience from which to
extract lessons about the institutional and organizational constraints under
which the agency operates. Those lessons may have implications for how
Congress drafts legislation, for how the Executive Office of the President
reconciles federal environmental policy with other national priorities, for how
the courts review agency action, and for how EPA can best be organized to
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address the problems of the 1990s and of the twenty-first century.
Accordingly, the articles published in this volume examine EPA as an
institution, concentrating on its internal functions and external influences on
its behavior.
Two articles examine different aspects of EPA's internal operations.
Alfred Marcus re-examines a debate as old as EPA itself over whether EPA
might function more effectively if it were organized differently.' Marcus
reviews the original debate within the Nixon Administration, and between the
administration and Congress, over whether to create a department that
combined supervision of natural resources and control of pollution or to
create a separate pollution control agency. After explaining why EPA was
organized as a pollution control agency, Marcus traces internal agency efforts
to organize departments along broad functional lines instead of along
medium-specific lines, with separate programs overseeing the programs
directed at air, water, solid waste, pesticides, and radiation. Despite early
planning efforts anticipating the functional design, the agency's early
organization coalesced along medium-specific lines, where it has remained.
Lakshman Guruswamy's comment examines more closely the case for
integrated pollution control and suggests how EPA can begin to implement
such a system.
2
Tom McGarity's article examines the decisionmaking procedures within
EPA as it exists today.3 He describes the agency's efforts to ensure
comprehensive participation in and review of major rulemaking initiatives
within the organization, and he analyzes the influence of the various program
offices and other offices on each other.
EPA's mission places it at the intersection of technology, science, and
economics. The articles by McGarity and Marcus each touch upon EPA's
efforts to institutionalize its understanding of all three bodies of knowledge.
The article by Arthur Fraas details EPA's efforts to incorporate economic
analysis into its decisions, as well as the efforts of the Office of Management
and Budget to ensure that such analyses are reliably conducted.
4
Three papers explore the relationship between the agency and the three
constitutionally created branches of the federal government. Bob Percival's
paper studies the efforts of every president since Nixon to coordinate
environmental regulation from some bureau within the Executive Office of
the President. 5 Percival explains how such oversight has consistently been
justified as a means of ensuring rationality in policymaking and coordination
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of environmental policy with other aspects of domestic and foreign policy,
and yet how it has often functioned as a means of providing regulatory relief
to regulated firms and industries. He makes proposals for advancing the
laudable goals of increased coordination and accountability in policymaking
without subjecting EPA decisions to undue political influence.
Richard Lazarus's article on congressional oversight subjects Congress's
relationship with EPA to similarly critical analysis. 6 Drawing on significant
recent empirical work from political science, Lazarus emphasizes that enacting
substantive environmental legislation is by no means the only contact
Congress has with the EPA. Numerous committees and subcommittees of
both the Senate and the House engage in frequent oversight of the agency
through hearings, to such an extent that the sheer volume of oversight
response work done by the agency can have an appreciable impact on its
ability to accomplish its substantive missions. Not only is oversight time
consuming, but its fragmented, uncoordinated, and undisciplined character
threaten, in Lazarus's view, any prospect for major shifts in EPA programs or
approaches to problems that may well be called for in the years ahead. Steven
Shimberg's comment reexamines the disadvantages of oversight found by
Lazarus.7
A common theme running through Percival's and Lazarus's articles is that
any evaluation of EPA's performance is radically incomplete without a
thorough understanding of the political forces shaping and influencing the
agency. Chris Schroeder's and Rob Glickman's paper on EPA and the courts
also studies the influence of politics on the agency, although only indirectly.8
Our article studies how changes in political assumptions concerning the
legitimacy of agency decisionmaking, the nature of congressional
decisionmaking, and the status of environmental protection as a social value
have all influenced federal judicial review of EPA rulemaking. We argue that
changes in the legal doctrines being applied to such decisions are ultimately
traceable to these underlying shifts in political assumptions.
Finally, a second contribution by Richard Lazarus presents a synoptic
picture of EPA's performance over the past twenty years.9 He argues that an
unfortunate yet pervasive atmosphere of distrust of the agency has from the
beginning restricted its capacity to carry out the ambitious mandates given to
it through environmental legislation. Indeed, the practically unachievable
ambition of much of this legislation has contributed to a cycle of promise,
failure, and recrimination that perpetuates the distrusting atmosphere he
describes. He recommends steps that might be taken to rehabilitate the
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agency, including a lowering of expectations, an increase in the agency's
capacity to engage in long-term planning, elimination of some of the
redundant congressional oversight, and a recognition that the public has by
and large had the benefit of conscientious public employees in the agency.
Without any pretense of comprehensive coverage, these articles and
comments do provide a number of valuable insights into the internal workings
of EPA. They also usefully stress the importance of understanding the larger
political environment within which the agency functions and which must be
accounted for in any overall assessment of agency performance. Along the
way, they advance a number of useful suggestions for changes in either the
internal operations of the agency or the external environment within which it
functions, suggestions that will help inform the ongoing debate over EPA's
role in implementing national environmental policy.
